Cigarette smoking leads to large healthcare and morbidity costs, and mortality losses, and smoking cessation plays a key role in reducing health risk and economic costs. While medical evidence suggests that some smokers are more likely to respond to medication treatment than others depending on genetic markers, it remains unexplored whether pharmacogenetic testing is cost-e¤ective in treating potential quitters of smoking. We address this knowledge gap by developing a lifecycle model in which individuals make smoking, health investment and consumption-savings decisions. Depending on an individual's genotype, smoking may bring enjoyment but deteriorates one's health, and the dynamic evolution of health capital determines life expectancy. In addition to heterogeneous genotypes, individuals also di¤er in demographics. We calibrate this model to …t key economic and medical observations in the U.S. We then propose three smoking cessation policies, two with standard treatments and one personalized depending on genetic markers, all under the same program costs. We construct two uni…ed measures of e¤ectiveness and subsequently compute the cost-e¤ectiveness ratio. We …nd that personalized treatment is the most cost-e¤ective: for each dollar of program cost, it generates $4:84 value in e¤ectiveness, which is 22 43% higher than those under standard treatments. The result is robust to several variations to the benchmark setting.
Introduction
Cigarette smoking is a leading preventable threat for global public health (Knopik et al., 2012; Mc-Clure et al., 2013; Jha, et al., 2013; Whiteford et al., 2013) . The costs of smoking include healthcare costs, morbidity (productivity) costs, and mortality losses (Max et al., 2004 ; Barendregt et al., 1997; Miller et al., 1999) . 1 While healthcare costs for smokers at a given age are as much as 40 percent higher than those for nonsmokers in the short term (Barendregt et al., 1997) , smoking-attributable healthcare costs are estimated to be 6-8 percent of American personal health expenditure (Miller et al., 1999) . The estimated total costs of smoking in California in 1999 is $475 per resident or $3,331 per smoker, with 54 percent due to healthcare, 10 percent due to lost productivity from illness and 36 percent due to premature deaths, where the value of life lost per death averaged $132,000 or 12.4 years (Max et al., 2004) . In addition, there is a signi…cant wage gap between smokers and nonsmokers, a negative wage e¤ect of tobacco about 10 percent for males using data from the Netherlands (van Ours, 2004) . Furthermore, it is evident that the costs of smoking are higher when including the sizable negative external e¤ects associated with second hand smoking. 2 Thus, smoking cessation plays a key role in diminishing the increased health risk and economic costs (Jha, et al., 2013) . Recent research shows that use of genetic markers in smoking cessation treatments has great promise ( (Chen et al., 2015) . 3 When receiving treatments, some smokers are more likely to respond to medication treatment than others (Chen et al., 2012; Bergen 1 Economics of Tobacco Toolkit (WHO, 2011) provides a comprehensive review of methods of estimating the economic costs of smoking. 2 Pickett et al. (2006) documents that 45.9 percent of American in counties without smoke-free law are exposed to secondhand smoke using data from the 1999-2002 National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey. They …nd that even in counties with extensive smoke-free law coverage, such exposure is still nonnegligible (12.5%). 3 They also help predicting increased risks for lung cancer (Amos et al., 2008; Thoreirsson et al., 2008) and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) (Pillai et al., 2009 ). et al., 2013). 4 Leveraging advances in genomics, the goal of precision medicine is to personalize treatments based on an individual's unique characteristics to maximize bene…ts and minimize risks resulting from side e¤ects. Whether pharmacogenetic testing should be implemented in the clinic depends on its cost-e¤ectiveness which require further investigation. Nonetheless, allowing physicians to select medications for individuals based on genetic factors that predispose to treatment response rather than on a trial and error basis via less precise non-personalized treatment may ultimately improve successful smoking cessation rates (Sturgess et al., 2011) . In the post-GWAS era, translational research from several disciplines, including behavioral science, ethics and economics, should be performed in parallel with ongoing genetic studies for smoking pharmacogenetic trials. This would be a critical step to enable implementation of genetic insights into routine clinical practice in order to reduce the global health burden of smoking (Furberg et al., 2010) .
Our paper is devoted to addressing the knowledge gap concerning cost-e¤ectiveness of personalized medicine treatment in smoking cessation. More speci…cally, we explore, under the same cost, what outcome di¤erences are between personalized treatment and non-personalized treatments. To undertake this task, we develop a lifecycle model in which key decisions on smoking, health and savings as well as life expectancy are all endogenously determined. We take into account the three main types of costs of smoking as in the literature. On the one hand, smoking accelerates health depreciation, thereby increasing demand for medical care (healthcare cost) and reduces labor income (morbidity cost). On the other hand, worse health results in lower life expectancy (mortality cost).
The main advantage of our approach for policy analysis is that we take into account individuals'endogenous response in a dynamic lifecycle setting. Moreover, individuals are allowed to be heterogeneous in their genotypes as newly advanced in the medical literature. Recent work shows that e¤ects of cessation pharmacotherapy vary with haplotypes in the CHRNA5 nicotinic receptor gene. Three common haplotypes span the CHRNA5 gene region (H1: 25%; H2: 44%; H3: 31%).
Using data from smoking cessation trials conducted at the University of Wisconsin Transdisciplinary Tobacco Use Research Center (UW-TTURC), Chen et al. (2012) identi…ed the usefulness of CHRNA5 genetic markers in predicting both cessation di¢ culty and treatment response (results replicated by Bergen et al., 2013) . While the high-risk haplotype (H3) is unequivocally associated with heavy smoking and most di¢ culty in smoking cessation, smokers of this type respond well to medication. In contrast, smokers with the low-risk haplotype (H1), though smoke less on average and are more likely to quit with counseling, do not bene…t from medication. Demographics are also found to a¤ect smoking behavior (see a critical review by Chaloupka and Warner, 2000) .
More speci…cally, male smokers typically smoke more cigarettes per day than women, and male demand for cigarettes tends to be more price elastic than is female demand (Giovino et al., 1994; Chaloupka, 1990 ; Chaloupka and Grossman, 1996) . Blacks are less likely to smoke and smoke less than whites (Chaloupka and Grossman, 1996) . Research has also shown a substantially positive e¤ect of education on health (Kenkel, 1991; Grossman and Kaestner, 1997; Lleras-Muney, 2005) and higher educated smokers are more likely to quit smoking (Chaloupkia, 1991). Finally, age is positively related to the number of cigarettes consumed per day (Giovino et al., 1994) . As such, our paper incorporates three important dimensions of demographics, namely, gender, race and education. This integrated framework thereby enables a thorough study of rich dynamic interactions between consumption-saving, health investment and smoking, where individuals'lifecycle pro…les depend critically on their demographics as well as genotypes. Under this setting, we can then evaluate various smoking cessation policies by aggregating individual-speci…c e¤ects in a systematic manner.
We then calibrate our model to …t key observations from the U.S. data. The set of targets includes economics data such as income, various expenditure ratios, and life expectancy. It also constitutes some medical experiment data such as gene-dependent smoking by Chen et al. (2012) and di¤erential gains in life years from smoking cessation by Jha, et al. (2013) . Our calibrated model predicts well that life expectancy of smokers is 11-12 years shorter than nonsmokers and that the high-risk H3-type smokers live slightly shorter than other types, consistent with medical evidence. Our computed potential gain in life years for smokers quitting successfully at age 35 is the largest for H3 smokers (9.5 years), compared to 8.7 and 8.9 years for H1 and H2 genotypes, respectively.
We further propose four separate measures of e¤ectiveness for three smoking cessation policies with the same program costs, two with standard and one with personalized treatments. The …rst two measures are the policy coverage rates given the same budget and the resulting quit rates. The third is Consumption Equivalent of a covered smoker, which is the percentage increase in consumption (at each point in time) that is needed, while …xing everything else unchanged, to reach a certain level of lifetime utility. The last is Income Equivalent of a covered smoker, de…ned in the same way but in terms of the percentage increase in labor income. We would like to note that our lifecycle setting captures the spirits of two separate strands of literature. 5 One strand is on health capital, building on the pivotal work by Grossman (1972a,b) .
Another is on health and life expectancy, pioneered by Rosen (1988) and Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) .
Our model is much richer not only because we endogenize consumption-saving, health investment, smoking and life expectancy, but also because we permit multi-dimensional heterogeneities. Our e¤ectiveness measures are more general than quality adjusted life years (QALYs) commonly used in the literature of medicine and health (e.g., see the guidelines provided by Gold et al., 1996) . Specifically, our lifetime utility based e¤ectiveness measures account for time discounting, diminishing marginal valuation and di¤erential utility weights. More importantly, our measures incorporate heterogeneous individuals'dynamic responses that enable us to capture di¤erent responses across di¤erent individuals at di¤erent ages over their life course. Our framework is ready to be applied to studying other types of addictive behavior, such as alcohol and illicit drugs. It can also be easily modi…ed for evaluating other types of precision medicine in treating various diseases.
The Model
To properly model smoking behavior and its health consequences over an individual's life course, we develop a lifecycle framework with endogenously determined life expectancy. In contrast with 5 The reader is referred to the handbook chapter by Chaloupka and Warner (2000) for a large body of empirical literature on smoking behavior and the e¤ects of smoking policy (e.g., cigarette taxes and smoking ban), beyond those relevant studies to our paper cited above. 
Model setup
Time is continuous. An individual's life starts at t 0 when she acts as a decision-maker (who may be referred to as a young adult). Her life ends at T which is endogenous and will be discussed later. 
where 0 and > 0 measure her preferences for smoking and health relative to general consumption. Importantly, individuals with di¤erent genetic markers will have di¤erent values of , which will be further elaborated when we conduct calibration analysis to …t the model with the data. As to be seen below, we will model the evolution of both nonhuman wealth and health capital as well as the wage-tenure pro…le. Thus, to avoid further complication, we elect not to include the habits of addiction stock in the utility function. 6 6 The reader is referred to Becker and Murphy (1988) for developing a habit-based rational addiction framework.
This literature generates valuable insights including better understanding of the short versus long run price elasticity
Letting be the subjective time discount rate, we can then write one's lifetime utility as:
where we have plugged in ‡ow utility in (1) . Thus, health raises an individual's lifetime utility via two channels: higher quality of life (via ln(h(t))) and longer life expectancy (via T ).
Two remarks are in order. First, in order for longevity to raise lifetime utility, it is necessary to ensure the ‡ow utility to be positive. Given the log functional form, this is met when we choose the scale of health and income properly so that their logged values are su¢ ciently greater than zero (to be further elaborated in Section 3.1 below). This strategy in essence follows Murphy and Topel Consider now an individual with work e¢ ciency , facing a market wage in e¢ ciency unit denoted by w (needless to say, all dollar measures are in real terms). In addition to her work e¢ ciency, her ‡ow labor income at time t depends critically on her labor market experience as well as her health status. While the former is standard in the labor economics literature, the latter captures the labor productivity e¤ect of health emphasized by Grossman (1972b) . Regarding these as two additive components of human capital, we can now specify the labor income obtained by an individual with work e¢ ciency as:
In this formulation, we conveniently align the measurement of human capital with health capital, so > 0 captures the relative importance of experience in labor income generation. Moreover, the of addictive consumption demand, albeiting potential bias due to endogenous response in smoking intensity, as elaborated by Adda and Cornaglia, 2006 . It is nonetheless beyond the scope of our paper. 7 One alternative is to follow Hall and Jones (2007) and Jones (2016) to add a constant u > 0 in ‡ow utility to ensure positive values. Another is to add a constant to the log function such as:
The latter setup would, however, generate extra income e¤ects on smoking which is inconsistent with the empirical evidence (Chaloupka and Warner, 2000) . parameter 1 > 0 measures the return to experience, 2 measures the curvature of this return, and e 1 (t t 0 )+ 2 (t t 0 ) 2 1 captures the experience-driven wage-tenure pro…le that is equal to zero at time t 0 (when the individual is fully inexperienced). Note that takes di¤erent values for individuals with di¤erent gender, race and levels of education -thus, although we refer to an individual as "she"for convenience, we do allow for gender di¤erences in earning as observed in the real world. We assume retirement age to be 65 for all individuals and set the retirement replacement ratio to be 0:5 in line with the literature.
In addition to labor income, an individual can also earn income from savings, which is in forms of holding an asset a that provides a yield at the market (real) interest rate r. This intertemporal decision is crucial for an individual to save for the "rainy days"of old ages when health deteriorates and health spending rises. In each point in time, her ‡ow (labor and interest) income is allocated to consumption, cigarette purchase and health-related spending that will be referred to as health investment x. Given the price per unit amount of smoking p, an individual's asset accumulation over her life course is governed by,
where _ a da=dt and labor income is given by (3) . That is, asset is accumulated when ‡ow income (ra + y) exceeds ‡ow expenditure (c + ps + x).
We next turn to the evolution of health capital where we highlight three important features. 
We now check the required properties. The bene…t of health investment is
where > 0 measures the extent to which health investment bene…ts health. To have diminishing returns in the bene…cial e¤ects of current health and health investment per unit of health capital on future health evolution, it is required that (t) > 0, > 0 and 0 < + (t) < 1 for all t.
The diminishing returns to health investment with age also requires 0 (t) < 0. We then examine the health deterioration rate, measured by [( + (t)s)h ] =h, where > 0 is the natural health deterioration rate. Thus, the health deterioration rate rises with smoking and falls with the current health status (because < 1), without additional assumptions. In order for the smoking e¤ect on the health deterioration rate to rise with age, we further restrict that (t) is an increasing function of t. In summary, under these parametric assumptions, the above functional form o¤ers a parsimonious setting that governs the evolution of health capital satisfying all the required properties. The dynamic optimization problem can therefore be divided into two steps. In the …rst step, we view the terminal date T as given. We then solve the lifecycle model in which an individual of type ( ; ) decides on consumption/saving, smoking, and health investment, all as functions of T , to maximize her lifetime utility given by (2) subject to asset accumulation and health capital evolution equations (4) and (5) . In the second step, we substitute the smoking and health investment functions obtained in the …rst step, denoted S(t; T ) and X(t; T ), into (5) to generate the path of health capital, denoted H(t; T ). Then we pin down life expectancy by solving
Model characterization
To solve the dynamic optimization problem, we set up the current-value Hamiltonian for each given value of life expectancy T :
H (c; s; x; t) = ln(c(t)) + ln(s(t)) + ln(h(t))
where 1 and 2 are the costate variables associated with asset accumulation and health capital evolution equations (4) and (5) . For the remainder of the paper, we will suppress time index t whenever it does not cause any confusion.
Let us focus on the pre-retirement period t min f65; T g. Applying Pontryagin Maximum
Principle in optimal control theory, we can obtain three …rst-order conditions with respect to c, s and x, and two Euler equations with respect to a and h. Straightforward manipulation of these …ve equations to eliminate the two costate variables leads to the following conditions for the dynamic optimization problem:
Equation (8) indicates that smoking relative to consumption increases with the taste for smoking ( ), but decreases with the price of cigarettes (p) and its (relative) health cost ( (t)=( (t)x (t) 1 )).
When medical treatment cannot e¤ectively mitigate the detrimental e¤ect of smoking on health (i.e., when is low), it is optimal for an addict to reduce or even quit smoking because her utility enjoyment is outweighed by her health deterioration. Similarly, a rising health cost of smoking as a result of higher medical spending (i.e., higher x) also discourages smoking. Furthermore, when one gets older, health investment becomes less e¤ective (i.e., 0 (t) < 0) and smoking becomes more harmful (i.e., 0 (t) > 0), thus inducing greater incentives for an addict to reduce or quit smoking.
Equation (9) is standard in dynamic economic models. It governs the dynamic path of consumption: consumption grows when the rate of return on saving exceeds the subject rate of time discounting. Typically, consumption is expected to grow (that is, r > ). Equation (10) governs the dynamic path of health investment. To gain insight from this complicated expression, we note that health capital deterioration when an individual is su¢ ciently old, toghther with diminishing returns in health investment with age (i.e., lower when old) imply that health investment may increase shaprly at later ages to maintain health capital above certain threshold. Meanwhile, the consumption-health capital ratio is expected to increase at least for older individuals. This implies that, from (10), health investment is likely to decrease eventually when approaching to the end of lifetime, which is consistent with diminishing returns in health investment and biological limitation of its e¤ect on health capital.
Although we cannot solve analytically the entire dynamic paths of consumption, smoking, health investment, health capital and assets, the three expressions above, (8)-(10), together with the two evolution equations, (4) and (5), and the boundary condition (6) can be used to solve numerically the …ve dynamic paths, fc(t); s(t); x(t); a(t); h(t)g T t=t 0 , and the endogenous life expectancy, T . To do so, however, we must …rst calibrate the model to …t the data to which we now turn.
Calibration and Numerical Solution
We are now prepared to calibrate the model to …t the data. Once this task is completed, we can then use the quantitative model to evaluate various policies on smoking cessation.
Our calibration exercises consist of three steps. In the …rst step, we calibrate all parameters for a representative individual, who may be regarded as the average individual. In the second step, we allow heterogeneity in preferences for smoking: for nonsmokers, we set = 0; for smokers, we calibrate the three 's for smokers with three genotypes associated with smoking addiction. In the third step, we allow heterogeneity in work e¢ ciency to calibrate 's for individuals in di¤erent demographic groups.
We discretize the life span so that one year corresponds to one period of time, and assume life starts at 18 years old (i.e., t 0 = 18). 8
Step 1: Calibration to …t the average
In the …rst step, we assume that individuals are homogeneous in all aspects so we have a single value for ( ; ), which allows us to calibrate all the common parameters to …t the average of each of the targeted data.
There are ten parameters, , , , , , , , , , and h, and two functional forms, (t) and (t), to be determined. Given homogeneous work e¢ ciency, we conveniently normalize w to be one. We preset the subjective time discounting rate as = 0:02, compromising the economics and the health and medicine literature. Then the growth rate of consumption (g) is set to equal that of output per capita in the US (1:8%), so the real interest rate becomes r = + g = 0:038. We set initial wealth to be 15% of initial labor income as permanent ‡ow income converted to capitalized value, that is, a 0 = 15% y 0 =r. Then a T is computed by multiplying a 0 and the compound interest rate over the life course to assure positive of growth of intergenerational asset accumulation.
We choose the functional form of (t) to be (t) = 0 (B e t ), with 0 > 0, > 0, and B > e T , where 0 , , and B are jointly calibrated to match the elasticity of health production with respect to health expenditure at age 18, 50, and T , which is 0:4, 0:25, and 0:042 respectively according to Hall and Jones (2007) . We then set initial stock of health at age 18 as h 0 = 100, and calibrate the threshold health level at death to be h = 38:5 to match the average mortality rate and the average life expectancy of the US popultion. 9 These provide natural boundaries of the health stock within which the dynamic path of health can be computed to …t real world data.
In the labor economics literature, the wage-tenure pro…le estimation usually yields an experience return at 3 5%. We thus take the average to set 1 = 0:04. Then to align health-based and experience-based human capital, we jointly calibrate and 2 to match income peak year around 52 and relative peak to initial income about 2.27, as documented in Guvenen et al. (2015) .
Consider that a nonsmoker who never invests in health over the entire life course (i.e., x = 0 for all t) would live for 50 years. This yields a natural health deterioration rate as a function of and health boundaries h 0 and h. To be consistent with medical evidence that smoking cessation at di¤erent ages has di¤erent impact on life expectancy (Jha et al., 2013), we specify (t) as a step function:
where 0 is set to 0 due to the empirically negligible health e¤ects of smoking at younger age (less 9 More speci…cally, we …rst compute the average mortality rate d over the life course from the average life expectancy of the U.S. population (78 years old). Then we pin down the average health deterioration rate over the life course using d = 1 than 30 years old), and the rest three 's are yet to be determined.
Thus, the main parameters that remain to be calibrated are related to preference, , , and to the e¤ectiveness of health investment, and , together with four 's related to the age-dependent consequences of smoking for health. These 7 parameters are calibrated based on 3 targeted ratios, the average life expectancy, the life year gap between smokers and nonsmokers, plus two agedependent incremental life saving …gures as a result of smoking cessation.
Denote y as labor income and Y as (total) income (labor plus interest earnings). There are three targeted ratios: results of 10 and 9.
To this end, we obtain the lifecycle pattern of income, health, health investment and smoking expenditure ratios for an average individual as shown in Figure 1 . Some remarks are in order.
First, while labor income peaks at around age 52, individuals start to dissave only at later ages;
meanwhile, health-investment-to-income ratio rises sharply at advanced ages. These are in line with the literature documenting that many elderly accumulate assets torward very advanced ages as a bu¤er against the expensive medical care arising from longetivity (e.g., De Nardi et al., 2015).
Second, the smoking expenditure ratio declines with age, although the amount of smoking increases with age at least during the …rst decade of smoking. The zigzag pattern of the smoking expenditure ratio is due to the simple step function form to capture the rising e¤ect of smoking on health.
Finally, despite health investment, health naturally deteriorates since age 18 until death.
Step 2: Heterogeneous preferences for smoking
In the second step, we allow for heterogeneity in preferences for smoking in order to capture di¤erent genotypes associated with smoking addiction.
In particular, we calibrate the three 's for smokers with three genotypes, H1, H2, and H3, while employing all other parameter values from the …rst step. We use cigarettes per day (CPD) for three types of smokers and shares of each type from Chen et al. (2012) , rescaling the amount of smoking to …t the model units which becomes our targeted value of smoking (s) for each genotype. Again, we conduct this task using the guessing-revising-converging algorithm. We obtain 1 = 0:365, 2 = 0:374, and 3 = 0:391, corresponding to H1, H2, and H3 types of smokers respectively. Of course, once a smoker quits smoking successfully, is set to be zero and their preference for smoking is regarded the same as nonsmokers. We are now prepared for utilizing the calibrated model to compute lifecycle pro…le for the three types of smokers and compare it with nonsmokers. Table 2 presents This arises from the life expectancy gap between smokers and nonsmokers, and the expensive health care at advanced ages. We note that life expectancy of nonsmokers is about a decade longer than smokers and that the health-investment-to-income ratio rises sharply in older ages when diminishing returns start to kick in. This increases the average healthcare expenditure ratio of nonsmokers over their longer life span. If we trim everyone's life span to be the same as the type with the shortest life (i.e., H3-type smokers), then the health-investment-to-income ratios become about 8 percent higher for smokers (see the last row of Table 2 ), in line with evidence in literature that health care cost for smokers is about 10 percent higher than nonsmokers at the middle age (Barendregt et al., 1997) .
With this node, we now turn to step 3 to calibrate di¤erentiated 's for individuals in di¤erent groups. 
Step 3: Heterogeneous work e¢ ciency
Later, we allow individuals' work e¢ ciency to di¤er by gender, race and education. Normalizing now the market wage in e¢ ciency unit as one (w = 1), we now calibrate di¤erent values of for each group. By construction, the population weighted average of must be one. Thus, is indeed a relative work e¢ ciency measure (relative to the mean).
Speci…cally, let the gender indicator be M (=1 for male and 0 for female), the race indicator be W (=1 for white and 0 for black), and the education indicator be C (=1 for college degree and 0 for no college degree). We then categorize all individuals into 8 (i.e., 2 2 2) groups. We calibrate 's of the eight cells of population by gender, race and education using PSID labor income of individuals (household head) aged between 23 and 26, normalized to an average of one. We pick this age range for three reasons. First, the vast majority of people have completed education and started working by 23. Second, their health may have not been signi…cantly a¤ected by smoking behavior by 26. Third, the experience may have not contributed much to their labor income.
In Table 3 , we report the population share of each group among smokers based on PSID data and the calibrated value of for each group. As can be seen, college educated all have higher than the mean work e¢ ciency and are thus expected to have higher labor income upon controlling the age. Black with no college degree, on the contrary, have much lower work e¢ ciency and hence lower labor income within the same age cohort. In addition, there is a gender gap that leads to higher labor income for males compared to females. Such gaps are larger for white than for black.
All these implied patterns for labor income are consistent with the labor economics literature. As In addition, it is noted from medical evidence (Chen et al., 2012) that the share of three genotypes does not vary signi…cantly across gender or education groups, but does vary much across racial groups. In particular, whites have a much larger share of H3 type than blacks (35% versus 6%), and blacks have a much larger share of H1 type than whites (51% versus 21%), while the share of H2 type is similar for whites and blacks. This heterogeneity in shares of genotypes will cause di¤erences in policy e¤ects for di¤erent racial groups as will be analyzed later.
Policy Evaluations
With the theoretical model calibrated to …t the data, we have a running numerical model that can be readily used for policy evaluation. In the interest of this study, we focus on evaluating smoking-cessation policy contrasting personalized with standard medications for smoking-cessation treatment. By doing so, we establish an integrated dynamic framework for a systematic cost-e¤ectiveness analysis on precision medicine in this regard.
Method
We conduct the analysis by comparing the e¤ectiveness of the following three government policies including two types of standard medication policies (S, S 0 ) and one personalized medication policy (P ), all under the same budgetary cost. Thus, whichever policy yielding greater value of e¤ectiveness is by construction more cost-e¤ective. The three smoking cessation policies are speci…ed as follows.
1. S: subsidize 10% of smokers randomly with a $600 voucher for both counseling and medication treatment, regardless of genotypes.
2. S 0 : subsidize 10% of smokers randomly with two types of vouchers: a $150 voucher for counseling treatment only, given to 5% of smokers, and a $1050 voucher for both counseling and medication treatment, given to another 5% of smokers, regardless of genotypes.
3. P : o¤er rebate to n% of smokers who have taken gene test to identify their genotypes associated with smoking addiction. The rebate consists of three parts. R1: $96 for gene test;
R2: $72 for counseling; R3: $432 for medication. All subsidized smokers receive R1 and R2, but only those identi…ed as H2 and H3 genotypes receive R3. The percentage of smokers that are subsidized, n, is determined such that the total budget is identical to that under S and S 0 .
Several important points regarding the design of the policies above are in order. Second, the size of the budget regarding 10% coverage of smokers in the benchmark case under policy S is also reasonable. 11 The current policy is for Medicaid to pay for all smokers. Since
Medicaid covers about 20% of the population, it is expected that more than 20% of smokers may use this bene…t. Moreover, the amount of the subsidy is only about half of the actual treatment cost incurred. Even by assuming that only a quarter of Medicaid eligible smokers take advantage of this bene…t, the size of the budget under our experiment would not be higher than the budgetary cost of the current policy through Medicaid coverage for smoking cessation.
Third, the three policies are designed on a revenue-neutral base, meaning that the total budget is equalized across all three policies. black), and education (college degree versus. no college degree). In addition, when modeling the 1 1 We could use other numbers without changing the main results of policy comparison.
cost of treatment or gene test, we also take into account the time cost (i.e., time needed for traveling, waiting, and receiving treatment) besides the monetary cost, and convert it into labor income using hourly wage of each group of population (again, using PSID data). Based on medical practice, we estimate that it takes about 9 hours to receive counseling, 7.5 hours for medication, and 2 hours for gene test.
Finally, we employ four measures for policy comparison:
1. Share of smokers that can be subsidized;
2. Quit rates of subsidized smokers; 
where U is the lifetime utility when the individual is covered by a particular policy. Denote by U 0 the untreated lifetime utility in the absence of policy intervention:
Hence, we derive Consumption Equivalent as:
Note that U is expected utility taking into account the probabilities that smoking cessation may either succeed or fail under a policy. These probabilities vary across individuals, depending on genotypes, education, and the type of treatment. 12 In addition, we regard relapse of smoking cessation as unsuccessful cessation and thus adjust the quit rate by deducting the relapse rate. 13 An alternative measure to CE is Income Equivalent, or IE, which is de…ned as the percentage increase in labor income (at each point in time) that is needed to satisfy the consumption increase as de…ned in CE. Mathematically, IE is determined by,
Applying (14) and manipulating, we obtain: Assume that an average smoker of any genotype has the same work e¢ ciency = 0:93. 
Findings
In this subsection, we begin by computing potential gains in life years for heterogeneous groups of smokers if cessation at 35 years old becomes successful and by contrasting the lifecycle pro…les in smoking, health investment, health capital and labor income between a quitter and a nonquitter.
We then conduct policy e¤ectiveness analysis and report results from policy comparison using the four measures described in the previous subsection. All the averaged …gures reported are based on population weighted measures of the most disaggregated groups (demographics and biomarkers). Table 4 reports the potential gain in life years (LY) for smokers with the three genotypes and their average if cessation (at 35 years old) is successful. The results suggest that, across the three genotypes, the gain in LY is the largest for H3 smokers (9.50 years), followed by H2 (8.91 years) and then H1 (8.75 years). This result matches medical studies which …nd that the gain in life years would be higher for H3 smokers. This is because that (i) the risk in mortality is higher for H3 as a result of smoking, and (ii) H3 smokers are less able to quit, more likely to smoke longer or inhale more deeply, and more likely to have longer duration of smoking. Table 5 shows life expectancy before and after quitting and life year gain for each of the 8 demographic groups (gender, race and education). Thus, all demographic groups gain life expectancy by quitting smoking, ranging from 8:0 to 9:6 years. Not surprisingly, groups with lower (e.g., female, noncollege groups) gain larger life expectancy than those with higher (e.g., the male, college group), due to diminishing returns in health investment and current health capital.
Gains in life years

Lifecycle pro…les: quitters versus nonquitters
We now contrast the lifecycle pro…les between a quitter and a nonquitter. In particular, we consider the quitter as to successfully stop smoking at age 35. For illustrative purposes, we focus on two demographic groups:
1. white females with no college degree: this is the largest group of smokers (45%), whose work e¢ ciency is far below one (0.79) and potential gain in LY from quitting is among the largest (9.4 years);
2. white males with college degree: this constitutes a small group (3%) of smokers, but has the highest work e¢ ciency (1.45) and the potential gain in LY from quitting is the lowest (8.0 years), so informative for comparison purposes.
For both groups, we choose H2 genotype, which constitutes the largest fraction of smokers in both demographic groups.
In Figure 2 , we plot the lifecycle pro…les of the smoking expenditure ratio (top panels), the health investment expenditure ratio (middle panels) and health capital (bottom panels). Let look at the case of white females with no college degree (left panels). In our calibrated model, all nonquitters'smoking rises with age at least during the …rst decade of smoking and then declines toward later age, consistent with evidence in the literature (Giovino et al., 1994; Chaloupka and Warner, 2000) , though the smoking expenditure ratio declines with age. Recall that the zigzag pattern of the smoking expenditure ratio is due to the simple step function form to capture the rising e¤ect of smoking on health (refer to the (t) function given by (11) and the calibrated values reported in Table 1 ). While the white males with college degree have a similar lifecycle pro…le (right panels), their smoking expenditure ratios are lower due to a higher opportunity cost of health deterioration and their quitting attempts are relatively more resistant (this last point is not re ‡ected in the …gure, but can be shown with quit rates, which is 59% for white males with college degree versus 43% for white female with no college degree). For both white females with no college degree and white males with college degree, labor income of nonquitters and quitters (stop smoking at age 35) are peaked at 51 and 52 years, respectively. At the corresponding peak years, the percentage gain in labor income of the former group is 1:89% whereas that of the latter group is slightly lower at 1:80%.
We turn next to the lifecycle pro…les of the health investment expenditure ratio. While for all groups the health investment expenditure ratios increases after the middle age, that of nonquitters increases at a higher rate, especially toward the end of life, suggesting a higher demand for investment in health by nonquitters. Moreover, throughout the life course, such ratios are larger to white males with college degree, compared to white females with no college degree. Speci…cally, the intensive margin e¤ect of quitting is to raise the health investment expenditure ratio at age 60 by 5:03% and 2:91%, respectively, for white females with no college degree and white males with college degree. In the latter group with longer life expectancy, such an intensive margin e¤ect rises to 4:25% at age 70 14 . This is essentially due to the positive income e¤ect: recall that the positive health e¤ect on life expectancy under our utility function setting makes health a luxury good relative to consumption. Thus, one should not overlook the cumulated detrimental health e¤ect of smoking especially for the older population.
Policy E¤ectiveness
We now report our main …ndings obtained by comparing the four key measures under the three proposed policies. 1 4 The intensive margin e¤ect of quitting on health investment may look di¤erent from estimates in medical literature which show that medical expenditures fall after smoking cessation in the short run (but rise in the long run due to longevity) (Barendregt et al., 1997) . This may be explained by the perfect foresightness assumption of our model that implies smoother expendture of health investment over the life course.
Share of smokers that can be subsidized
Revenue-neutral policy comparison implies that 12.20% of smokers can be subsidized under policy P . This means policy P may cover 22 percent more smokers for treatment than S or S 0 (Table 6 ). Due to personalized medications, we identify a large extensive margin e¤ect to cover more addicts with di¤erential treatments based on genotypes.
Quit rates Table 7 reports the quit rates of subsidized smokers under the three policies. Note that these quit rates have been adjusted by the relapse rate in one year (51.4%). Yet, policy S 0 is not as e¤ective, which is again mainly due to the worse-o¤ of H2 and H3 types under S 0 as some of them do not receive medication. In addition, we observe that H3 smokers receive larger gains measured in CE and IE than other types under S and P , while H1 smokers are almost indi¤erent between S and P . This suggests that H3 smokers may receive the largest bene…ts from smoking cessation, and that personalized medication is expected to be most e¤ective for H3 smokers compared to others. Table 9 shows results for each demographic group by gender, race, and education, where the last six columns reports CE's and IE's under the three policies proposed. 16 Notice that the bene…t of a smoking cessation policy largely decreases with work e¢ ciency ( ). As a consequence, CE under P , for example, of white, college, male smokers is among the lowest (6:14%), and of black, non-college, female smokers is the highest (10:51%). The main reason is the diminishing returns to current health capital and health investment. The white, college, male smokers have already invested more in health, smoked relatively less before quitting and had better health, hence the bene…t received from quitting and larger health investment after quitting is smaller. Moreover, demographic groups with a relatively larger share of H2 and H3 genotypes (e.g., the white groups) bene…t relatively more from P than from S 0 . 
Summary
To summarize the results of policy comparison, policy S and P have similar e¤ects in terms of the quit rate and CE or IE for subsidized smokers, but P is able to cover 22% more smokers than S, since it saves budget by not subsidizing H1-type smokers for medication while not reducing the e¤ectiveness of treatment. Policy S 0 is the least e¤ective among the three, as it not only covers fewer smokers, but also results in a lower quit rate, and lower CE or IE (see rows 2-5 of Table 10 ). higher than under the two standard treatments. Hence, we conclude that personalized medication treatment is the most cost-e¤ective.
Robustness check
In this section, we conduct a number of robustness check to assure the validity of our policy recommendation. In particular, we consider the cases when smokers are able to quit without relapse at age 35, or receive treatment and quit at age 50. We also examine the case when smoking cessation is a gradual process in the sense that quitting occurs with a delay. Additionally, we reevaluate policy e¤ectiveness when only deadweight cost of treatment is taken into account.
Quit without relapse
In the benchmark evaluation, we assume about half of smokers who quit at the beginning relapse and return to smoking in a year. Policy e¤ects may be much larger if there is no relapse. Thus, in this subsection, we evaluate the same policies but setting relapse rates to be zero for all groups.
While the coverage rates of three policies and life year gains from quitting are the same as the benchmark case, the quit rates are more than doubled now. As a result, Consumption Equivalent (CE) and Income Equivalent (IE) also more than double the benchmark, and the cost-e¤ectiveness ratio (C/E) are more than halved (Table 11 ). However, the increase in e¤ectiveness of policy P compared with S and S 0 is very close to the benchmark, which is about 22% and 45%, respectively. 
Quit at 50
Another critical age for smoking cessation is 50, as smoking becomes much more detrimental to health over 50. Thus, we examine the e¤ectiveness of policies when they subsidize smokers at age 50, assuming the quit rate unchanged for each group though. across demographic groups, and those with lower have slightly higher gain. We note that this gain may look better in data (6 years) partly because smokers incur relatively more health expenditure in data than in our model 17 . 
Quit with delay
So far we have assumed that cessation happens at the same year of treatment, but in the real world it is often a gradual process and may occur a few years after treatment. Typically, H3 smokers experience the longest delay, followed by H2, and then the H1 (Chen et al., 2015) . Thus, in this subsection we reinvestigate policy e¤ects when cessation delays are taken into account, and we allow for di¤erential delays for the three genotypes and for treatment at di¤erent ages.
As documented by Chen et al. (2015) , for H1-H3 smokers, 25% of them quit at age 37, 38, 40 respectively, with 3 years cessation delay for H3 compared with H1, and the median quit ages are 52, 54, and 56, respectively, for the three types, with 4 years delay for H3 compared with H1.
Hence, we reevaluate the policies which are implemented on smokers at age 35 and 50 respectively, assuming all of those who quit only do so with a delay. In addition, the length of delay varies across genotypes, which is 2, 3, 5 years for H1, H2, H3 smokers respectively when they are treated at 35, and 2, 4, 6 years for them respectively when they are treated at 50. All the quit rates remain the same as in the benchmark case. Table 16 shows that, when smokers quit with a delay, the gains in life years are about one year less than the no-delay case. Speci…cally, it is now 8.11 years on average when receiving treatment at 35 (actually quitting at 37, 38, 40 for H1-H3, respectively), which is 0.9 year less than that when quitting at 35 without delay, and it is 2.88 years on average if being treated at 50 (actually quitting at 52, 54, 56 for H1-H3 respectively), 1.2 years less than the no-delay counterpart. We also note that, in contrast to the no-delay cases, the life year gains are no longer the largest for the H3 type.
In fact, the H3 type has the shortest life year gain when quitting at 50 with delay, because this group experiences the longest delay. Furthermore, policy e¤ectiveness measured in CE and IE is also the lowest for H3 for the same reason (for brevity, not shown in the table). 18 
Deadweight cost
In the benchmark case, the cessation treatment cost includes the monetary cost of treatment incurred to smokers and the government, plus the time cost for smokers. However, the monetary cost is eventually paid to hospitcals, medical companies and professionals, and thus the total cost to the society is not as large. Thus, we reevaluate the policies only considering the deadweight cost.
To do this, we add back the total monetary cost of treatment as a lump-sum transfer to subsidized smokers at the subsidized age 35. Table 19 shows a summary of policy comparison. As can be seen, the results are very close to the benchmark. The income e¤ect generated from the lump-sum transfer, may have either a positive e¤ect on health due to a higher health expenditure budget, or a negative health e¤ect, due to more cigarette purchase. Thus the overall e¤ect is small, which supports the robustness of the benchmark evaluation.
Conclusions
To address the knowledge gap concerning cost-e¤ectiveness of personalized medicine treatment in smoking cessation, we have developed a lifecycle model with smoking, health investment, savings and life expectancy all being determined endogenously. We have calibrated the model to …t key economic and medical observations and explored how cost-e¤ective personalized treatment is compared to non-personalized treatments. We have shown that, under the same program costs, personalized treatment provides coverages for more and maintain high e¤ectiveness. For each dollar of treatment subsidy, personalized treatment generates 4:84 Income Equivalent in e¤ectiveness, 22 43%
higher than those under standard treatments. Our …nding is robust to various settings regarding relapses, quitting ages, quitting delays and net deadweight cost of medical treatment. We have therefore concluded that personalized treatment is the most cost-e¤ective in smoking cessation by a signi…cant margin.
To this end, we would like to acknowledge the limitation of our study. While we value health and quality of life, it is modeled as a gradual process. Should smoking result in respiratory diseases, especially lung cancer, the quality of life may be lowered sharply and medical cost raised suddenly.
Thus, the actual private cost of smoking should be higher than that computed from the model.
Moreover, we do not model the cost of smoking as a result of second-hand smoking. We may thus underestimate the social bene…t of cessation. Thus, one may view our e¤ectiveness …gure as a conservative measure. 
